1. Introduction

The paper, following the charge of the title, is necessarily about relationships. Which relationships and how should they be approached?

Initially, I will give some attention to the intellectual bases claimed for comparative education, and the intellectual claims for a science of education and the sciences of education. I will also note the ways in which comparative education and the sciences of education are established within organisational structures, i.e. their institutionalisation.

In approaching these themes, I also keep in mind certain (over-simple) working distinctions of the following kind:

a) comparative education seen as a body of theory about education in cross-national perspective and, institutionally, based in universities. The intention in such work is to improve our powers to understand education cross-nationally, to offer explanatory propositions. For this category of comparative education, I use the term “academic comparative education”; *mutatis mutandis*, academic educational sciences;

b) comparative education seen as a teaching act, where this teaching is carried out in colleges and universities. The intention in such work is the transmission of our understandings of education to the young teacher in training or the replacement or ourselves by qualified younger scholars. The result of this activity is the reproduction and renewal of the semi-profession of education and our academic sub-group within it. For this category of comparative education, I use the term “professional comparative education”; *mutatis mutandis*, professional education sciences;

c) comparative education seen, intellectually, as the effort to affect through writing (cf. political participation), policy choice in education. Institutionally, this activity is typically carried out in national and international...
governmental and non-governmental organisations. The intention of such
writing is to constrain educational decision making, cautioning against
some choices, advocating others. The intention of such writing is to act
upon the educational world. The result of the activity varies. For this
category, I use the term “interventionist comparative education” (1).

I am aware that the same individual may practice and advocate all three ty-
pies of comparative education activity. I am aware that a governmental or
non-governmental organisation may contribute to theory building. I recog-
nize that a university department, centre or a university-based research team
may set out to practice “interventionist comparative education”. I acknow-
ledge that not all training of future comparative educationalists is carried
out within formal higher education. To repeat, the distinctions drawn are so
that the topic may be approached tactically; the distinctions are initially
useful ways of organising discussion.

Strategically, it is the reciprocal interaction between the intellectual and insti-
tutional forms of the comparative educations and the intellectual forms of
the institutionalisation of the educational sciences which are of concern. A
very lengthy paper would trace (i) the interaction of the legitimacy claims
for the three kinds of comparative education as they affected each other;
(ii) the interaction of the ways in which the three comparative educations
are institutionalised and their effects on each other; (iii) the internal inter-
action of the legitimacy claims for the various educational sciences (iv) their
internal reciprocities in institutionalisation; before proceeding to an account
of the mutual interrelations between (i) and (ii); then (iii) and (iv) — and so
on. As a logic, the permutations are finite. Any such paper would, to an au-
dience, feel infinite. Let me, then, pick out only certain of the strategic inter-
relations.

2. Intellectual bases: comparative education

Academic comparative education underwent, in the 1960’s and 1970’s, what
would fashionably (but poorly) be termed a paradigm shift. More precisely,
the relative hegemony of an historical approach to comparative education
was broken. Alternative ways to do academic work in comparative education
were suggested (2). The participants were university academics. The debate
was partly about purpose and mostly about method. Notice, first, on purpose, that at least two of the protagonists in the debate (E.J. KING and B. HOLMES) sketched the possibilities of an "interventionist comparative education" in terms of both appropriate methods and relatively new purposes. That is, they made much more precise those tentative and embryonic statements, of their distinguished academic predecessors of the interwar years, that comparative education had a role in the practical world. My own judgement of this event is that it has been extremely difficult since then to ignore, in academic comparative education, the possibility of close liaison and a working relationship with government or international agencies. A new principle of legitimacy had been introduced.

I accept, of course, that in practical terms N. HANS and J.A. LAUWERS were among the first persons to act as consultants for UNESCO, and that the careers of several distinguished members of this Society involve movement between university institutions and governmental and non-governmental agencies which undertake interventionist comparative education. The practice is not dissimilar from the practices of distinguished economists or sociologists. What I am stressing is that in academic comparative education a principle of legitimation for these activities was explicitly established.

In terms of relationship two comparative educations — academic and interventionist (3) — were brought closer together by new statements of purpose.

Notice, second, on method, that three of the protagonists in the 1960's debate — BERDAY, NOAH and ECKSTEIN — framed their proposals in terms of the more rigorous and sustained use of the social sciences. They too, but in ways dissimilar to those of KING and HOLMES, wished to strengthen intellectually academic comparative education. NOAH and ECKSTEIN advocated the collection of "hard" data and its use — in the form of quantitative analyses — in hard ways. BERDAY advocated the application of a range of social sciences — history, political science, anthropology etc. — to interpret, cross-nationally, pedagogic data.

A fresh definition of what constituted quality, in work in comparative education had been introduced. (This was later to have a serious impact on Comparative Education Review.)

However, hard data, technique of social science work, and social science interpretations were becoming influential in the work of several international agencies, notably OECD. In terms of relationships, the effect was again to bring closer together one kind of academic comparative education and interventionist comparative education. Both modes, at the level of technique and approach, legitimated the other.

Internally within academic comparative education, the effect was somewhat divisive. Within Europe among comparative educationist the self-evident
excellence of social science approaches was not widely accepted. In the
United States, the claims of newer approaches were, if not self-evidently
excellent, most sympathetically considered. International meetings began to
show, in their published discussions, the reservations of European educators
about some of these techniques (4). Academic comparative education had
taken a step toward becoming nation-specific.

There was also, in this same decade, a development within American (and
mid-Atlantic) studies of education which I think has been undernoted and
undervalued. In intellectual terms, legitimacy was denied to academic com-
parative education (5). Only the separate specialists in the social sciences
were fitted to do comparative education; and a proper comparative educa-
tion would arise from their work. The principle advanced was an extreme
version of one of BEREDAY's sub-arguments. In BEREDAY's text on com-
parative method, the interpretation of pedagogic data through a single social
science is permitted, in the working notes of a comparativist, at one early
stage in the methodology (6).

The full implications of such a position, erected into a principle for defining
all of comparative education, or at least that which deals with developing
countries, are demonstrated by the intellectual organisation of the FISCHER
volume. Separate sections are devoted to four major social sciences: anthro-
pology; sociology; political science and economics (7). (Psychology was
omitted because of the balance of skills among the people at the Confer-
ence (8).) Each article within each section examines education from one rele-
vant social science perspective.

The full logic of this principle of legitimacy for academic comparative educa-
tion would seem to be the formulation that: a theoretically sound academic
comparative education would emerge if, first, there were established compa-
rative approaches based in the theories and methods comparative anthropo-
logy applied to the relationships of society and education, comparative appro-
aches based in the theories and methods of comparative political science,
etc., etc., etc. The second stage would be likely to be "meaningful exchange
and cooperation between social scientists and professional educators with
respect to the comparative study of schools in different societies" (9).

Note also the sub-variant of the argument: that academic comparative educa-
tion should be strongly associated with one social science. For example,
BEREDAY wonders if political geography, or comparative government and
international relations should be thrust into a hegemonic role (10). Alterna-
tively, C. ANDERSON has regularly outlined academic agendas based in
sociology and comparative education (11). This form of the debate is now
relatively quiescent in the USA. But these are signs of it emerging in Britain.

Finally, in this initial discussion of the intellectual bases and legitimating
principles in comparative education, a comment on the internal relations
between professional comparative education (defined as teaching activity) and the other forms of comparative education would be appropriate.

The purposes and content — including the sequencing of content — in teaching comparative education change as the intellectual basis of academic comparative education changes.

If the intellectual stress in academic comparative education is on the "forces and factors" which make each nation unique, then students are likely to be treated to some demonstration of the intellectual organising principles and their applicability to unique situations. That is, students will be given a comparative demonstration of, let us say, race, language, religion and geography as these differently combine in particular nations and affect educational policy outcomes differently. Other parts of the course will be demonstration of the uniqueness or particular nations' educational systems. This was, for example, the main pattern of the comparative course in the Diploma in Education, in London University for many years.

Alternatively, if the intellectual stress in academic comparative education is on the perspectives of the social sciences, overseas experience and so on, course organisation will require exposure to several social sciences, the gaining of language competence, and, for specialists, residence overseas. G.Z.F. BEREDAY has made this model theoretically explicit. The principles underpin the specialist training at Teacher's College, Columbia, New York.

Equally, if in academic comparative education there is some intellectual stress on the possibilities and purposes of an interventionist comparative education, teaching will incorporate examples of wise — unwise interventionist educational policies in comparative perspective, drawn from international and national examples, and indicate the method by which such interventionist comparative education might be improved, intellectually. In practice, of course, all three models are typically used in most teaching programmes. The question is how consistently the principles of one of the academic comparative educations are translated into the teaching situation.

There is then, finally, a relation between the substantive work of interventionist comparative education and professional comparative education. For example, one thinks of the use of Learning to Be in the teaching of comparative education; of the remarkable excursion undertaken by the Robbins Report into comparative education; of the OECD Examiners' Reports on Educational System; and of the substantive studies provided by, for example, IBE, the World Bank, the Council of Europe and OECD. These are all materials around which discussions with advanced students can be organised.

However, in terms of the direction of the relationship, it may be noted also that in several ways the work of the international organisations has defined some of the work of academic comparative educationists. For example, the
work which HANS was attempting to do on the statistics of education is now carried out by several international agencies (linked with national agencies), most notably UNESCO. In turn, these statistics are the basis of much academic work. The relationship is not entirely one way. Individual scholars such as F. HILKER (on stages of educational systems) and J.A. LAUWERYS (on ISCED) have constructed taxonomies which were of some use to international agencies, and work by B. HOLMES with the International Bureau of Education on and through a taxonomy of education systems has been particularly close (12). On balance, however, as M. DEBEAUVIAIS points out, the direction of influence has been in one main direction:

"In this field practice has taken the lead over theory. Comparative education as an academic discipline seems to have fallen somewhat behind the progress made by the statisticians who produce comparative data on educational systems and the experts (administrators and policy-makers) who use them. This situation is not frequent in the social sciences where theoretical work is often ahead of the data which allow conceptualisations and models to be put to the test of practice."

DEBEAUVIAIS then defines, correctly I think, a direction of relationship. Note also the triadic links, in this area, between interventionist, professional and academic comparative education.

This is a function of a division of (academic) labour. Some tasks are too large for academic comparative education; and some tasks too small for national or international agencies. In particular, large scale comparative studies based in field work are now extremely difficult and expensive to organise, since the IFC. This task then falls to national and international agencies.

What these agencies are asked to create an interventionist comparative education about, is derivable from political rather than intellectual principles. From time to time, this raises an ethical problem. These have remained embryonic in comparative education; although they have been discussed.

3. Intellectual Bases : the educational sciences

A full analysis of the educational sciences would logically follow the pattern followed in the commentary on academic, professional, and interventionist comparative educations. That is, some indication of the internal intellectual relations between the triad of comparative educations would be paralleled by a commentary on the internal intellectual relations between the triad of three types of educational studies — academic, professional and interventionist.

In the context of this Conference, however, this would be to trespass heavily upon W. MITTER's theme "Educational science or educational sciences?"
Permit me, then, to develop a restricted commentary on the educational sciences, sufficient only to keep my general line of argument moving, and to lay a base for the final part of the paper, using where appropriate a Background Paper provided for the Conference by M. FIGUEIREDO (14).

Academic education science began to undergo, in the early decades of the twentieth century, what would be fashionably (but poorly) termed a paradigm shift. More precisely, the relative hegemony of the study of education through history (including comparative education) and the philosophic principles of the great educators was broken by the increasing amount of work in psychology, and the application of psychological principles to education. History and normative philosophy, whether in their Durkheimian formations in France or in their formulations by R.H. QUICK, M. SADLER, J.W. ADAMSON and Sir NUNN in England, had claimed legitimacy in the offering of a vision of purpose to the teacher (and thus to the child). Psychology offered a chance to understand the child — and to measure some of the child’s attributes. The third typical element in the science of education was the principles and methods of teaching. These, too, were increasingly informed by psychological theories (e.g. of HERBART, PESTALOZZI, MONTESSORI and DEWEY) rather than distillation of current practice (15).

In England, the gradual splitting off, or separation out, from “the principles of education” of separate intellectual approaches to education is a dominant theme for the remainder of the century. Before 1939, for example, Sir ADAM’S Book *The Evolution of Educational Theory* (1920) and WHITEHEAD’S *The Aims of Education* (1932) looked, both, backward to general “principles of education” and forward to the separate studies of philosophy of education which developed in the post-war years. In holding a part-time Chair in the History and Administration of Education in Manchester in 1906, Sir SADLER in that new role, and in his writings had anticipated no less than three specialisms to arise from “the principles of education”. After 1945, the splitting process increased. Intellectually, what had been a moral vision became a technical one; education studies were split into separate sciences of education (16). In some of the continental countries, such as France, Italy, Belgium, it is perhaps the case that these centrifuged tendencies were resisted longer; though psychology as in England made an early and separate impact (17). In the USA, the splitting movement occurred earlier than in both the continental countries and Britain; the Americans developing early an interest in psychology and the principles of educational administration.

My argument, based on a deliberately brief account of developments, is than that within (the) educational science(s) this century, a treble fragmentation has occurred. First, the emphasis on the wisdom of the past represented by the educational ideas of great thinkers, was broken by the addition of psychology to studies of education. Psychology was different in kind. It was attempting to build up hard date. It offered the possibility of technical appli-
cation of its precise knowledge. Second, and especially after 1945 other social sciences, for example sociology and later economics, entered claims that they too offered theories which permitted rapid changes in society to be understood, had techniques for assembling collections of social facts, and could assist in improving the condition of society. In the post-war years, their claims to legitimacy were marked by rapidly expanding literatures in, for example, sociology of education and the economics of education. Third, the normative core of a science of education, the English “principles of education” began to split intellectually into history of education, comparative education and philosophy of education.

Paralleling these separations in the academic study of education, were the development of the courses and texts for “professional” educational sciences, and the generation of an interventionist sociology and economics of education. And paralleling these developments in turn that the area of “methods of teaching” began, intellectually, to sub-divide and split. In principle, professorships in methods of teaching mathematics or art or science might be created. Or specialisms in elementary; or secondary; or higher education might be institutionally established.

If expertise, organised in terms of the supposed interventionist needs of the educational system, is the legitimating principle for the sub-division of the educational sciences, then the field of study continually splits. The only counterbalancing forces to this centrifuge is the intellectual creation of a new principle of legitimation which re-integrates educational studies (paradoxically by excluding several new claimants), or the sociological inertia and impact of the existing ways in which academic educational sciences are institutionalised. It is to the institutional forms of comparative education, and more briefly, the educational sciences, that I now turn.

4. Institutionalisation and some relationships: comparative education

Where there is little institutionalisation of academic and professional, or interventionist comparative education, the chances of establishing it are, at least, minimally linked with the acceptability of the principles of legitimation which are advanced. This is perhaps most obvious in the creation of the international interventionist agencies, such as UNESCO and OECD. Both incorporated rather clear understandings of what their interventionist role would be.

Within academic comparative education, the principles of legitimation have to be made clear both to other academics within the university, and perhaps to university administrators. It is also useful, for successful institutionalisation, to make the principles of legitimation clear to important groups outside the university.
The difficulties — and differences — in doing this in different national contexts are not, as far as I know, researched. On what precise terms, for example, did Professors SCHNEIDER, ROSSELLO, LAUWERYS, IDENBERG, KANDEL and ULICH negotiate their Chairs and legitimate their activities? Occasionally something of these processes are known, as in the case of N. HANS (18). So some of what we need to know about the initial institutionalisation of comparative education, then in Europe and the USA, now in Egypt and Venezuela, is biographical. But biography is not all.

We also need more separate institutional accounts of the early difficulties, and of the teaching programmes and degree structures which were established in the major metropolitan institutions. And we also need some account of the national academic and political frames within which institutionalisation was successfully managed.

For example, I think the shift in legitimacy principles in the 1960's in American academic comparative education should be partly interpreted through the internal sociology of the large American university. The need to justify courses and especially Ph.D. degree programmes to academics outside of educational studies, and intermittent Examiners from outside the University, meant in the context of the 1960's that intellectual legitimation would be sought in the social sciences. Which social sciences was clearly a severe tactical problem, which BEREDAY, NOAH, and ECKSTEIN solve in different ways. In other universities, such as Chicago, Wisconsin and UCLA the particular forms which comparative education took are, also, I suspect not merely an accident of auto-biography of the innovators involved, but of the institutionalised power of different intellectual perspectives which dominated the historical and social science Graduate Schools.

Secondly, I would interpret the stress within the academic agenda of American comparative education, especially in its substantive work on the USSR and Latin America in geo-political terms. Similarly, the relatively rapid development of both comparative development studies of education and “international education” must be located in the geo-political situation of the USA in the 1960's. Thus, in parallel, I would locate the newer studies in colonialism and education which are being published by American authors in the disappointment and anxiety over the relative intellectual failure of the earlier development studies — but also in the changing geo-political situation of the USA in the late sixties and early seventies.

The degree of support from outside agencies, including the major Foundations, is known mainly to the participants. But it is well known for example that research monies have been consistently made available for comparative work by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the major Foundations, such as Exxon and Ford.

The outcome of these institutionalisation processes in the USA was major
However, note that the prestige of the separate educational sciences varies internally and externally.

Internally, because of the historical conditions under which the science of education developed, philosophy occupy relatively important positions vis-a-vis the rest of the educational sciences. In the 1950’s for example in Spain, pedagogics was located within the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy. Within the first year, the studies included “philosophy of education, psychology, the technique of pedagogical investigation and general pedagogy” (20). The situation in the Netherlands until the late forties was perhaps extreme, in that “until 1948, pedagogic studies were governed by Royal Decree of the 1st June 1921, in which pedagogics were considered to be a branch of philosophy” (21). The subsequent situation in which the separate subject of pedagogics was located within the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy was not all that dissimilar from the situation in the rest of continental Europe. In Britain the university situation is less clear organisationally, but the same prestige rankings prevailed until the late 1950’s at least. This it not the case in the United States, for philosophy of education.

Externally, however, psychology and sociology, in relation to Foundation sponsored research, and government sponsored policy research have been successful in claiming a share in resources and research ie externally prestige can be measured in money; and this success can be, sometimes, transferred back into prestige within the university. T. HUSEN has traced some of these processes from the late forties in the USA, West Germany and Sweden (22).

In this competition within institutions for scarce resources, it is unclear whether internal or external criteria of worth, and thus reward, and thus, which educational sciences, will prevail. What is clear, is that an area of educational studies like Foundations of Education in the United States, which is unspecialised in academic terms and relatively impoverished in terms of external funding is placed at risk. Organisationally unified, it is intellectually disunited (23). In institutional terms, such Departments exist to place in perspective the specialised work of other departments within a School of Education. Thus, in principle, exposure to the teaching of a Department of Foundations will permit a student to understand the philosophic, historical, sociological and perhaps psychological and comparative foundations of the student’s major interest, say, elementary education. The interventionist role of a Foundations Department is typically limited, and the academic work such a Department centrifugal. In other words, members of a Foundations Department will often form a liaison with other Schools in the university. It has been difficult to define an integrating principle for organising academic knowledge in such departments that would match the institutional solution of juxtaposing practitioners in the several fields in the same sub-unit of the organisation. The integration role intended for the Foundations Department is also frequently misunderstood, and criticised in terms of the
legitimacy of the studies if undertaken.

In a situation of contracting resources, Foundations Departments are likely to be placed at risk, when specialisation, and fragmentation of the educational sciences has reached a certain point. Foundations Departments on the external criteria of cash for interventionist activity do poorly; on internal criteria of the hard expertise of the more narrow educational sciences, they are likely to be suspect.

Similar pressure on resources may produce claims for the dissolution of the institutional place of comparative education within the academic educational sciences.

6. Relationships and a conclusion?

Permit me to pull together several of the themes in the argument, and advance the argument to a conclusion.

a) At the turn of the century, and in many countries for most of the century, the study of education was unified by the conviction that education was a moral, basically a philosophical study, best understood by grasping the wisdom of the past, especially as this had been expressed in the principles of education outlined by major thinkers. This unified concept of educational studies was fragmented by the gradual addition of particular sciences of education. They claimed special facts of education as their own, devised special techniques for the discovery of those facts, and used special intellectual perspectives to organise these facts as sciences. Psychology was the first of these sciences of education to enter such claims, and the first to gain institutional acceptance. The history of education, philosophy, sociology and economics of education in turn generated claims to academic status — as expert forms of knowledge, as separate disciplines of education.

b) Within this fragmentation, two forms of specialisation should be noted, (i) the addition of expert sciences (e.g. psychology, sociology) and (ii) the differentiation of the moral core of educational studies into philosophy of education, history of education and comparative education, which began to generate their own special substantive concerns and vocabularies.

The addition of more specialised sciences to existing specialisations within education is, in principle, unlimited. Anthropology, political science, biosociology, systems analysis, futurological studies — all, can state claims for inclusion as analytic ways to understand education. Such a process finally raises the issue of whether an integrating principle for the study of education, and studies in education, would be (i) desirable and (ii) possible.
The differentiation of the moral core of educational studies is marked by a retreat from the moral and the normative in philosophy of education and history of education. Practitioners in each field (at least in the USA and Britain) have made an effort to rewrite philosophy and history of education to that they are as precise, in technique, as possible. Precise technique is, or at least has been for the last thirty years, a powerful legitimator of an academic field in the human sciences in university studies.

Within academic comparative education, a somewhat similar process has occurred: a retreat from the moral and normative, and an extension of the range, power and detail of techniques. In general, the Americans took more rapid steps toward the creation of a technical science of comparative education than did the Europeans. Whether in a concern for historical forces and factors (HANS, SCHNEIDER), or national character (MALLINSON), or the normative circle (HOLMES) or the cultural envelope (KING), or philosophical models of man (LAUWERS), the Europeans were slower to break with questions of how to analyse the moral order of cultures, how to enter relativistically the minds of men, in general, the Europeans were much less impressed in the 1960s the claims of the expert social sciences, or a social science, as saviours of comparative education, and much more convinced that comparative education already contained an integrative principle: the relation of the ideas of men to their institutions.

The search for useful technique(s) of measurement, by the Europeans, was undertaken seriously, but as a second order activity to their theoretical problematic.

c) The claims for the academic legitimacy of comparative education within the sciences of education thus varied. The extreme form of the claims by some Americans led to a potential Balkanisation of comparative education — its factorisation into various social sciences. The expertise of comparative education would be established on the basis of a disintegrative principle, in this mode. In another form of argument, the expertise of comparative education would be established by the integrative power of the perspectives and techniques of one social science (for example sociology); or, in an extreme version of this argument, by technique itself (NOAH and ECKSTEIN). The outcome of these claims, often brilliantly argued by particular individuals, was the strengthening of academic comparative education within the internal sociology of American universities — themselves characterised by the concern for the expert. The Europeans, on the other hand, tended to enter the legitimacy claim that academic comparative education was already unified and unique. But, within the internal sociology of universities increasingly characterised by educational studies stressing either technique and expertness of the immediately practical, this was a difficult claim to sustain. Similarly, the rapid creation of an interventionist comparative education, from a university base but in liaison with major national funding agencies, should be noted in the USA; and compared
with the relatively unsuccessful European efforts, from a university base, to achieve something similar — despite two rather clear accounts of the point, purpose and methods for so doing.

d) The upshot, in a time of diminishing resources for educational studies, is a contemporary condition of some difficulty for academic comparative education. Somewhat like the study of the Foundations of Education in North America, its claims to academic legitimacy are frequently misunderstand or denied. Within a university, interdisciplinary is a difficult tightrope to walk. Where its legitimacy is denied, hegemonic claims for its rescue are entered by saviour-disciplines, such as sociology in the UK currently. Where its academic legitimacy is denied, and/or when school-oriented educational studies begin to dominate the initial training of teachers, the place of professional comparative education (i.e. as a teaching activity) becomes questioned. Later, this begins to make even the replacement of specialists difficult, as well as immediately increasing, through a poorly balanced intellectual introduction to the role of teacher, a technocratic view of what it is to act as an educator. The processes — of delegitimation, withdrawal of resources etc. — are probably cumulative. A cycle of decline sets in — the reverse of the 1960s expansion.

7. A Future

The themes of tension and conflict, gloom and doom, have been so manifest in the analysis so far, it is, I think, hard to recognise that there might be a future. I think we do have something of a crisis on our hands; but so does everyone else. Educational studies themselves are likely to undergo various strategic reassessments, to diminish their increasing centrifugal tendencies; and philosophers of education (24), and sociologists of education are contemporaneously reviewing their activities (25). No doubt a rapide counter-case could be written, stressing the success of our journals, our expanding professional societies, and the increasing volume of literature produced in the name of comparative education. On such a view there is, at worst, a temporary crisis in the status of academic and professional comparative education, which a new agenda of topics for research would rapidly solve. I do not accept that this is the correct way, even to approach the problem of our future position within the educational sciences — though of course we will study new topics as educational systems and socio-economic realities changes. There will be new agendas forced on us, but created by our piecemeal activities, year by year, and best understood retrospectively than offered prospectively. A mere listing of topics for study will not do as a definition of our future.

Second, note that we will, if the line of argument in this paper is accepted, have different futures as we have begun in comparative education to have

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differents pasts. To legitimise and institutionalise comparative education among the educational sciences in Egypt, in Venezuela, in Algeria and so on may pose strategically similar problems, but the tactical difficulties of responding to the internal sociology of universities, institutes and research agencies will vary, as will the work agendas suggested by different geo-political locations, pressing problems within the education system, and the rewriting of various foreign traditions of how to study comparative education. We will diverge.

Third, I offer the judgement that our future within the educational sciences should not be permitted to depend either on our copying the techniques of the expert social sciences, which are now struggling with their own conceptual revolutions anyway, or on a very rigid and self-demarcation of educational topics that we will insist are ours alone. On the contrary, fluidity of intellectual boundary is to be encouraged, even if this places us in difficulty institutionally within universities where claims to be a discipline are for the moment more powerful as legitimators than claims to be interdisciplinary. Even there, note that HUSEN (op. cit.) has held up comparative education and the economics of education as examples of holistic integration which should be emulated as educational research generally becomes increasingly cross-disciplinary.

Where, then, might there be a future?

I thing in a synthesis and systematisation of several suggestions which are already sketched in part, or piecemeal in the literature and in some of our current activities.

We study intra-educational phenomena say curriculum or early childhood education or equality of access to and output from schooling systems. But we also study them in relation to social phenomena such as demographic or economic change, or political developments, or religious and ethic minorities. Finally we do all of this comparatively i.e. as best we can we study these intra- and extra-educational phenomena and relations in two or more national states, typically looking for similarities and differences, with the intent of understanding or improving our own educational system.

Thus the nation-state is one of our main units of analysis. I think we should now take the national state as problematic — though not in the usual sense of seeing it as too large a unit and pleading for comparison within nation states. Rather, the opposite. That is, we should perceive the nation state as too small a unit for comparative analysis.

We have tended in academic comparative education to examine the relations of *intra- and extra educational phenomena within two or more nations* — and then to suggest on the basis of this downward and inward examination what the relation of the phenomena is like under specific conditions or in
certain cultural contexts. The relation of the phenomena has finally taken our attention; the nation state is a most valuable unit of study because it reveals the complication of such relationships between phenomena. We have tended to take for granted one of our main units of study, seeing the nation state as a collection of different patterning of the key relationships we want to investigate. When we have looked outward from the nation states we are examining, we have simply brought our comparative education inward again — to inform our own system of education. In this sense we bring our comparative education home to roost; we domesticate it.

We should, I think, look upwards and outwards to the educational relations between states, to the cross-national transfer of educational ideas and to the interventionist educational activity of nation states on each other, and the contribution of the international agencies to this. That is, we should take seriously the kind of work pioneered by M. CARNOY, and the king of work sketched by R. ARNOVE (28). This is not to suggest that the work must necessarily be done within a neo-Marxist framework.

Within a sustained and systematic orientation to the study of educational relations between states most of our existing substantive work finds a place, but is reconceptualised. For example, the distinctions which have grown up between comparative education, development education, and international education (as the exchange of scholars and students) collapse. The case studies of national systems of education on which we spend so much labour stand — but must be reconceptualised in terms of the export and import of ideas and practices in education. The studies we do of curriculum, for example, might start in HOLMES’ models of essentialist, encyclopaedist, pragmatic and polytechnical curricula, and would investigate them as world models whose distribution should be understood in relations between nation states. Similarly the international and regional agencies have been studies, for example at our last Conference in Valencia. The theoretical perspective of educational relations between nation states would suggest they now must be studied. They are central to the problematic. Equally, the relevant and useful social science disciplines are judged by how they illuminate inter-nation education relations. For example, comparative economics government less useful than international relations (i.e. the academic study of political relations between states). For educational policy makers and their relation to comparative education, an important question becomes how to insulate — as well as how to borrow — educational practice.

Comparative education has tried to avoid being ethnocentric. In so doing it has become nation-centric.

By seeing comparative education as inter-nation educational relations, interventionist and academic and professional comparative education can share rather fully a set of mutual concerns — and most of our traditional base, in literature and in our investigation of the nation state can remain. The nation
state, however, is now treated as the middle unit of comparative educational analysis, between intra- and extra educational phenomena on the one hand, and relations between nation states on the other. We have traditionally repatriated our comparative education. Expatriated in the terms I have described, it embodies a unique integrative principle which serves to retain but unite much of our past activity, and may unite some of our futures.

FOOTNOTES

1. None of the terms “academic”, “professional” or “interventionist” are intended to carry perjorative undertones or celebratory overtones (or vice versa). They are used to classify activities in comparative education, as these have been outlined in the text on the double parameter in each case of intellectual legitimacy claim and institutional location.


3. The point in footnote one is repeated. E.J. KING’s careful exemplification of one kind of “interventionist comparative education” in the fifth edition of Other Schools and Ours: comparative studies for today (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, London, 1979), is to establish distinctions between ways of intervening. I accept that the debate is now an important one in the social sciences. I stay here with the more minimal meaning I have given the term.

4. See, for example, the topics chosen by several of the Europeans in contrast to the Americans, as well as the tensions over methodological issues, in (eds) R. EDWARDS, B. HOLMES, J. VAN DE GRAAFF, Relevant methods in comparative education: report of a meeting of international experts, Unesco Institute for Education, Hamburg, 1973.


6. After that one working stage, in BEREDAY’s methodology, the lengthy training of the comparativist in languages, and several social sciences, residence abroad, and a specialised training in comparative education itself permits the comparative educationist to synthesise, and to carry out problem analysis and total comparison. That is, put bluntly, BEREDAY’s view is that only the trained comparativist can do compara-
tive education; and only the experienced comparativist can do good comparative education. He explicitly requests the use of the insights of all of the social sciences within the same comparative study, in so far as the relevance of all the social sciences is suggested by the nature of the problem under investigation.

8. Op. cit., p. vi, footnote 3, where FISCHER also notes, however, that "...psychologists have not been very interested in country-to-country comparison".


19. See, for example, Proceedings of the First World Congress of Comparative Education Societies: The place of comparative and international education in the education of teachers, Ottawa, Canada, 1970, in which a high proportion of the papers are concerned with how to teach comparative education.
23. See, for example, J. PIETIG "Is foundations of education a discipline?", Educational Studies, vol. 8, No. 1/2, 1975.